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[Sac. No. 7797. In Bank. June 27, 1967.] 
JOHN MARKLEY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CLAUDE 
A. BEAGLE et al., Defendants, Cross-defendants and 
Appellants ; TRAVER J. SMITH, as Testamentary 
Trustee, etc., et al, Defendants, Cross-complainants and 
Appellants. 
[1] Landlord and Tenant-Liability to Third Persons-Actions-
Evidence--Sufficiency.-In an action for damages for injuries 
received when a warehouse railing gave way, a jury verdict 
for plaintiff against the owners of the building was suf-
ficiently supported by the evidence, where the plaintiff was an 
employee of an independent contractor engaged by the owners' 
tenant, and therefore a business invitee of the owners, and 
where the jury could reasonably conclude that the dangerous 
condition of the railings was due to work previously done by 
other contractors engaged by the owners and the owners were 
negligent in failing to discover such condition and to correct it 
or adequately warn plaintiff of it. 
[2] Damages-Instructions-Impairment of Earning CapacitY.-A 
trial court's instruction, after plaintiff's medical expert had 
testified to his estimate of plaintiff's loss of earning capacity, 
did not tend to prejudice defendants by telling the jury tha t 
elements of damages could be "proved by evidence which, if 
believed, fixes the amount precisely or places it within precise 
limits, or gives you adequate information to enable you to fix 
the loss with a reasonable degree of certainty," where there 
was no reason to conclude that such instruction (with its 
clearly stated alternative that the evidence need merely be 
adequate to enable the jury to fix the loss with a reasonable 
degree of certainty) misled the jury into believing that the 
expert's estimate was deemed by the court to be precise. 
[Sa, Sb] Landlord and Tenant-Liability to Third Persons-Duties 
to Invitees of Tenant: As Governed by Labor Code.-There 
was no basis for limiting the responsibility of owners of a 
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Independent Contractors, § 24. 
lIcK. Dig. References: [1] Landlord and Tenant, § 318(3); [2] 
Damages, § 203; [3] Landlord and Tenant, §§ 316(7), 318(4) (f); 
[4] Master and Servant, §2; [5] Evidence, ~§210, 285; [6] Evi-
dence, § 209; Master and Servant, § 149; [7] Evidence, §§ 210, 
238; Master and Servant, § 149; [8] Master and Servant, § 149; 
Evidence, §§ 209, 249; Records, § 35; [9, 15] Indemnity, § 21; [10] 
Landlord and Tenant, §§ 318(3), 318(5); Indemnity, § 21; [11] 
Indemnity, § 5; [12] Contracts, § 160; [13, 14] Indemnity, § 6. 
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building, with regard to compliance with Labor Code safety 
railing orders, and the trial court did not err in instructing 
the jury that such orders were applicable to them, where 
plaintiff, an employee of an independent contractor retained 
by the tenant, was injured in a place of employment provided 
by the owners to penuit servicing of the tenant's equipment, 
and the injury resulted from a negligent condition existing 
after other contractors, retained by the owners, had finished 
working on the premises. 
[4] Master and Servant-Existence of Relationship.-Under Lab. 
Code, § 6304, defining "employer," an employer-employee rela-
tionship between the person injured and the owner of a place 
of employment is not essential for application of the Labor 
Code generally. 
[6] Evidence - Admissions-Agents - Limitations on Reception: 
Res Gestae-Declarations After Transaction.-The statement, 
to plaintiff's investigator, of a former employee of defendant 
contractors, as to work done on the premises of codefendant 
owners, was not admissible as a spontaneous declaration, nor 
as a vicarious admission within the scope of his employment, 
where the statement was made almost a year after plaintift 
was injured and even longer after the work was done, and 
when the employee was no longer employed by the contractor 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 1807, subd. 5; Evid. Code, § 1222), nor was 
i,t admissible as a declaration against interest, where the em-
ployee in no way admitted that he was negligent. 
[6] Id.-Admissions-Agents of a Party: Master and Servant--
Actions-Admissibility of Evidence.-Former Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1851 (now recodified in Evid. Code, §§ 1224,1302), providing 
that, where the question in dispute between parties is the 
obligation of a third person,· whatever would be the evidence 
for or against such person is prima facie evidence between the 
parties, did not change the rule that hearsay statements of an 
agent or employee not otherwise admissible against the princi-
pal or employer are not made admissible merely because they 
may tend to prove negligence of the agent or employee that 
may be imputed to the principal or employer under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. 
[7] Id.-Admissions-Agents of Party-Limitations on Reception: 
Hearsay-Application of Rule of Exclusion: Master and 
Servant-Actions-Admissibility of Evidence.-In an ordinary 
negligence action against an employer whose liability mayor 
may not tum on the negligence of any particular empioyee or 
ex-employee who has given hearsay statements about the work 
out of which an accident arose, there is no basis for an 
assumption of reliability that would justify dispensing with 
the oath and cross-examination so as to exclude the operation 
) 
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of the hearsay role, unless such statements qualify as sponta-
neous declarations, were made within the scope of the employ-
ment, or were so damaging as to be admissible as declarations 
against interest. 
[8] Master and Servant-Actions-Admissibility of Evidence: 
Evidence-Admissions-Agents of a Party: Hearsay-Excep-
tions-Dedarations: Records-Judicial Records.-The terms 
"obligation or duty" in former Code Civ. Proc., § 1851, relating 
to prima facie evidence, and ''liability, obligation, or duty" in 
Evid. Code, §§ 1224 and 1302, relating to exceptions to the 
hearsay rule, do not include tort liabilities of employees that 
are imputed to their employers under the doctrine of respondeat 
8uperior. 
[9] Indemnity-Actions-Evidence--Admissibility.-In an owners' 
action for indemnity against their contractors, the liability of 
an employee of the contractors was not a ''liability, obligation, 
or duty" within the meanings of Code Civ. Proc., § 1851 and 
Evid. Code, §§ 1224,1302, relating to prima facie evidence a~d 
exceptions to the hearsay role, where it was imputable to the 
eontractors only under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 
[10] Landlord and Tenant-Liabilities to'l'hird Persons-Evi-
dence: Harmless Error: Indemnity-Actions-Evidence and 
Review.-In a personal injury action against the owners of a 
building and the contractors who had performed work there-
on, in which the owners filed a cross-complaint for indemnity 
against the contractors, the erroneous admission of a hearsay 
statement by a former employee of the contractors, tending to 
place responsibility on the contractors for creating the dan-
gerous condition of the premises, was not prejudicial to the 
defendant owners, where the statement had no bearing on 
whether the owners should have discovered that condition, and 
where, moreover, it was the owners who offered the statement 
in evidence, but was prejudicial to the contractors as to the 
judgments aganist them in favor of the plaintiff and of the 
owners on their cross-complaint. 
[11] Indemnity-Operation and Interpretation.-The extent of 
contractors' duty to indemnify the owners of property mUllt be 
determined from the contract and not from the independent 
doctrine of equitable indemnity, where the parties expressly 
contracted with respect thereto. 
[12] Oontracts - Interpretation - Functions of Courts. - In the 
absence of conflicting extrinsic evidence, the interpretation of 
a contract is a question for the court. 
[13] Indemnity-Operation and Interpretation-Liabilities Cov-
ered.-An indemnity contract by which contractors agreed to 
hold owners hannless and defend them in "any suit at law for 
damages which might arise in connection with the agreed 
) 
() 
) 
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work" upon the owners' premises was not limited to causes of 
action arising while the work was in progress, but included 
causes of action arising thereafter. 
[14] Id. - Operation and Interpretation - Liabilities Covered._~ 
Me~ nonfeasance by an indemnitee, such as negligent failure 
to discover a dangerous condition arising from the work per· 
fonned by indemnitor contractors, will not preclude indemnit) 
under an indemnity clause phrased in general terms such al 
one covering "any suit at law for damages which might arise: 
in connection with the agreed work." 
[16] Id.-Actions-Trial, Evidence and Review.-In a persona 
injury action, in which the owners sought indemnity fron 
their contractors, the trial court did not err in denying th. 
contractors' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdic 
for the owners, made on the ground that the contract pre 
eluded any duty to indemnify, where the indemnity clause wa: 
. phrased in general tenns and where there was substantia 
evidence that the plaintiff's cause of action arose in conneotioJ 
with work performed by the contractors on the ownen 
premises and that the negligence of the owners was passiv. 
rather than active. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Sacra 
mento County and from orders denying motions for jud@ 
ment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new·trial. Charle 
W. Johnson, Judge. Judgment affirmed in part and reverse 
in part; order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdi( 
affirmed; appeals from order denying new trial dismiMed. 
Action for damages for injuries sustained by workman l 
defective railing gave way; cross-complaint for indemnity b 
owners against contractors. Judgment for plaintiff affirme 
as against defendant owners and reversed as against defendru 
contractors; judgment for owners on cross-complaint aga.in 
contractors reversed. 
Rust & Hoffman, David C. Rust, and Ellis J. Horvitz fe 
Defendants, Cross-complainants and Appellants . 
. 
McGregor, Bullen & McKone, McGregor, Bullen & Eric 
find George W. Bullen for Defendants, Cross-defendants aI 
Appellants. 
[14] See Cal.Jur.2d, Indemnity, § 14; Am.Jur., Indemnity (1 
ed § 15). 
) 
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Lancaster & Yorton and Burt Lancaster for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-Plaintiff was injured when a railing 
along a mezzanine in a warehouse gave way and he fell to the 
floor below. At the time of the accident he was going to the 
roof of the building to service a fan of the ventilating system 
of a restaurant on the ground floor. About ten months hefore 
the accident, the owners of the building sold certain equip-
ment to contractors who agreed to rt'll10ve it from the building 
in a workmanlike manner. The equipment included bins that 
had been built around the guardrail on the mrzzanine from 
which plaintiff fell. 
Plaintiff brought this action against the contractors and the 
owners to recover damages for his personal injuries. He 
alleged that the contractors negligently created the dangerous 
condition of the railing in removing the bins and that the 
owners negligently failed to inspect the premises and to either 
correct the condition or warn plaintiff of the danger. The 
owners cross-complained against the contrartors for indemnity 
in the event plaintiff should recover a judgment against them. 
The jury returned verdicts in favor of plaintiff against tlJ(> 
owners and contractors on the complaint and in favor of the 
owners against the contractors on the cross-complaint. The 
trial court entered judgments on the verdicts. The owners and 
the contractors appeal from the judgments against them and 
from an order denying their motions for a new trial. The 
contractors also appeal from an order denying their motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the cross-
complaint. The appeals from the order denying the motions 
for new trial must be dismissed. (Code Civ. Proc., § 963; Rod-
riguez v. Barnett, 52 Ca1.2d 154, 156 [338 P .2d 907] .) 
[1] The evidence is sufficient to support the verdict in 
favor of plaintiff. The jury could reasonably conclude that in 
removing the bins the contractors were negligent, either in 
depriving the railing of support necessary to make it safe or 
in removing the railing and then replacing it improperly. 
Plaintiff was an employee of an independent contractor 
engaged by the tenant who operated the restaurant to service 
the ventilating system. He was therefore a business invitee of 
the owners to whom they owed a duty of reasonable care. 
They knew or should have known that he would use the nwz-
zanine to get to the fan on the roof, and the jury could 
reasonably conclude that after the removal of the bins, the 
) 
) 
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owners were negligent in failing to discover the dangerous 
condition of the railing and to either correct it or adequately 
warn plaintiff of it. 
Both the contractors and the owners contend that the 
combination of plaintiff's closing argument on the issue of 
loss of future earnings and the trial court'8 instruction on 
special damages resulted in prejudicial error. 
[2] Plaintiff's medical expert testified to his estimate of 
plaintiff's loss of future earning capacity, and in his argu:--
ment plaintiff's counsel urged the jury to accept the expert's 
E'stimate. After instructing with respect to past and future 
medical expenses and past and future loss of earning capaci. 
ty, the court instructed that" Any of the elements of damages 
thus far specifically mentioned can be proved by evidence 
which, if believed, fixes the amount precisely or places it 
within precise limits, or gives you adequate information to 
enable you to fix the loss with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty." Defendants contend that this instruction in effect 
told the jury that the expert's estimate of future loss of earn-
ing capacity was precise evidence and therefore misled the 
jury into accepting plaintiff's argument that it should accept 
the expert's estimate. There is no merit in this contention. 
The expert's estimate provided a reasonable basis for deter-
mining plaintiff's future loss of earning capacity (see. CO'II-
nolly v. Pre-Mixed Concrete 00., 49 Ca1.2d 483, 489 [319 P.2d 
343]), and there is no reason to conclude that the instruction 
misled the jury into believing that the expert's estimate was 
deemed by the court to be precise. Thus, the . instruction 
concluded with the clearly stated alternative that the evidence 
need merely be adequate to enable the jury to fix the loss 
"with a reasonable degree of certainty." 
[Sa] The owners contend that the court erred in instruct-
ing the jury that safety orders governing railings issued 
pursuant to the Labor Code were applicable to them. [4] The 
term "employer" as used in the safety provisions of the 
Labor Code is defined to include "every person having direc-
tion, management, control, or custody of any employment, 
place of employment, or any employee. " (Lab. Code, § 6304.) 
An employer-employee relationship between the person injured 
. and the owner of a place of employment is not essential for 
application of the Labor Code. (Porter v. Montgomery Ward 
'" Co., 48 Cal.2d 846, 847-849 [313 P.2d 854].) [3b] In 
the present case plaintiff was injured in a place of employ-
ment provided by the owners to permit servicing of their 
) 
) 
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tenant's equipment, and the injury resulted from a condition 
existing after the contractors had finished working on the 
premises. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for 
limiting the owners' responsibility to comply with the safety 
urders (cf., Woolen v. Aerojet General C(Jlrp., 57 Ca1.2d 407, 
412-413 [20 Cal.Rptr. 12, 369 P.2d 708]; Kuntz v. Del E. 
Webb Constr. Co., 57 Ca1.2d 100, 106 [18 Cal.Rptr. 527, 368 
P.2d 127]), and the trial court did not err in instructing the 
jury with respect to those orders. 
[5] The contractors contend that the trial court erred in 
admitting into evidence a statement made by Hood, one of 
their employees, to an investigator representing plaintiff. 
Hood was one of the workmen who participated ill removin~ 
the bins from the warehouse. He stated to the investigator 
that the workmen had removed and reinstalled the guardrail 
along the mezzanine from which plaintiff fell. He made the 
statement after his employment with the contractors had 
. terminated. It was offered in evidence by the owners over the 
contractors' objection. 
Since Hood's statement was made almost a year after the 
accident happened when he was n9 longer employed by the 
contractors, it was not admissible as· a spontaneous declaration 
(see Dillon v. Wallace, 148 Cal.App.2d 447, 451-452 [306 P.2d 
1044]) or a vicarious admission within the scope of his 
employment. (See Code Civ. Proe., § 1870, subd. 5; Evid. 
Code,- § 1222.) Nor was it admissible as a declaration against 
interest, for Hood in no way admitted that he was negligent 
or even stated just what he did, if anything, in removing and 
replacing the railing. 1 
[6] Plaintiff contends, however, that the statement was 
admissible under former Code of Civil Procedure, section 
1851, which provided: "And where the question in dispute 
between the parties is the obligation or duty of -a third person, 
1 The admissibility of declarations against interest is now governed by 
section 1230 of the Evidence Code, which provides: "Evidence of a state-
ment by a declarant having sufficient knowledge of the subject is not 
made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as 
a witness and the statement, when made, was so far contrary to the 
declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far subjected him to 
the risk of civil or criminal liability, or so far tended to render invalid a 
claim by him against another, or created such a risk of making him an 
object of hatred, ridicule, or social disgrace in the community, that a 
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless 
he believed it to be true." Although this section was not a}lplicable to 
the trial in this case, which occurred before January 1,1967 (Evid. Code, 
112), the comment of the Assembly Committee on Judiciary points out 
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whatever would be the evidence for or against such person is 
prima facie evidence between the parties." (This provision 
has been recodified in Evidence Code, sections 1224 and 1302.) 
lIe asserts that his cause of action against the (:.outra(·tors was 
based in part on Hood's negligence in performing the work, 
that Hood's responsibility for such negligence is ~m obligation 
or duty of a third person, and that Hood's statement would 
be admissible as an admission in an action against Hood even 
though it did not qualify as a declaration against interest. 
(See former Code Civ. Proc., § 1870, subd. 2; Evicl. CodE', 
§ 1220; 4 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1048, p. 4.) He 
concludes that Hood's statement is therefore admissible undl>r 
section 1851 against his employers. Similar reasoning may be 
advanced to sustain the admissibility of Hood's statenwnt in 
the owners' action for indemnity against the contractors, for-
the duty to indemnify, just as the liability to plaintiff, might 
arise from Hood's negligence in performing the work. 
'Ve have found no case involving liability based on respon-
deat superior in which section 1851 has been applied or 
discussed. It has frequently been applied in actions against 
sureties or gua.~antors to permit the introduction into evi-
dence of out-of-court statements of the defaulting party. (See, 
e.g., 'Bittte County v. Morgan, 76 Cal. 1, 5 [18 P. 115] ; Nye « 
Nissen, Inc. v. Central etc. Ins. Corp., 71 Cal.App.2d 570, 576 
[163 P~2d 100] ; Standard Oil 00. v. Houser, 101 Cal.App.2d 
480,489 [225 P.2d 539].) It has also beenapplieu to sustain 
the admissibility of a judgment against a corporation in an 
:lction to enforce a stockholder's statutory liability (EUs-
worth v. Bradford, 186 Cal. 316, 325 [199 P. 335]) ;of an 
admission of embezzlement by an employee in an action on hi-; 
employer's indemnity bond (see Piggly Wiggly Yuma 00. v. 
New York Indemnity Co., 116 Cal.App. 54], 542 [3 P.2fl 
15] ) ; of an admission of receipt of summons by a judgment 
(lebtor in an action against his insurf'r baspd (~n a d('fault 
judgment against the judgment debtor (Langley v. Zurich 
General .·ter. &- Liab. Ins. Co., 219 Cal. 101, 104 [25 P.2(1 
418]); of a declaratory judgment fixing the rights of two 
that «« Except for the requirement that the declarant be shown to be 
unavailable as a witness, Section 1230 codifies the hearsay exception' for 
derlaration::l against interest 1\::1 tllat exception has been developed by the 
California courts (People v. Spriggs, 60 Ca1.2d 868, 36 Ca1.Rptr. 84:1, 389 
P.2d 377 (1964» and possibly expands that exception." Even if Hood 
was availahle :l.S a witness, since hi~ statement was not against intere8t 
untler section ] 230, it was :11::10 not against interest under the law ap-
pJirable at the time of trial. 
) 
) 
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joint venturers in an action by one of them against the 
other's attorney for conversion of funds of the venture (Mil-
ler v. Rau, 216 Cal.App.2d 68, 78 [30 Cal.Rptr. 612]) ; and of 
the admission of one joint owner of an automobile, in an 
action against the other joint owner under the financial 
responsibility laws, that she had given the driver permission 
to drive (Ingram v. Bob Jaffe Co., 139 Cal.App.2d H13, 19R 
[293 P.2d 132]). 
The language of section 1851 is susceptible of an interpreta-
tion that would make the statement of an employee admissible 
in an action based on respondeat superior against his employ-
er, and some commentators have urged that the principle of 
the foregoing cases supports such an interpretation. (Tenta-
tive Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence (Art. VIII,Hearsay Evidence), 6 Cal. Law 
Revision Com. Rep., Appendix, pp. 495-496 (1964).) We are 
convinced, however, that the failure of any .case to consider 
that possibility was not the res~lt of oversight, but reflected a 
tacit understanding that section 1851 did not change the 
settled and apparently universally followed rule that hearsay 
statements of an agent or employee not otherwise admissible 
against the principal or employer are not made admissible 
merely because they may tend to prove negligence of the 
agent or employee that may be imputed to the principal or 
employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior. (Miller v . 
.Amon~8mith Ccmstr. Co., 185 Cal.App.2d 161, 166 [8 Cal. 
Rptr. 131] ; Bridges v. County of Los Angeles, 131 Cal.App. 
2d 151, 154 [280 P.2d 76] ; West Coast Life Ins. Co. v. Craw-
ford, 58 Cal.App.2d 771, 785 [138 P.2d 384] ; Taylor v. Bern-
heim, 58 Cal.App. 404,409,410 [209 P. 55] ; Herman Waldeck 
cf Co. v. Pacific Ooast S.S. 00., 2 Cal.App. 167, 169 [83 P. 
158] ; see Converse v. Blumrich, 14 Mich. 109, 122 [90 Am. 
Dec. 230] [" The rule that would allow an agent, after a 
transaction is closed, to admit away the rights of his princi-
pal, would be too dangerous to be tolerated for a moment 
[citing cases]"]; see 19 Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 433; 1 
R.C.L. 510, § 50; 75 A.L.R. 1534.) 
In referring to the "question in dispute" as being "the 
obligation or duty of a third person," we believe the statute 
contemplated those situations in which such an obligation or 
duty was an essential operative fact in establishing the cause 
of action or defense involved. Such situations may arise when 
the declarant and the party have a privity of interest in the 
property involved (see Ingram v. Bob Jaffe Co., supra, 139 
I 
I 
I 
) 
960 MARKLEY v. BEAGLE [66 C.2d 
Cal.App.2d 193, 198) or the party is one who has assumed 
responsibility for the obligations of the declarant, such as a 
guarantor, surety, or insurer, or one, such as a shareholder, 
made liable by statute for his corporation's debts. As Wig-
more states: "So far as one person is privy in obligation with 
another, i.e. is liable to be affected in his obligation under the 
substantive law by the acts of the other, there is equal reason 
for receiving against him such admissions of the other as 
furnish evidence of the act which charges them equally." (4 
Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1077, p. 118.) He points 
out that "the admissions of a person having virtually the 
same interests . . . and the motive and means for- obtaining 
knowledge will in general be likely to be equally worthy of 
consideration" as the admissions of the party himself. 
[7] These reasons for extending vicarious liability from 
the substantive obligation involved to the admissibility of evi-
dence to prove that obligation break down, however, in the 
case of an ordinary negligence action against an employer 
whose liability mayor may not turn on the negligence of any 
particular employee or ex-employee who has given hearsay 
statements about the work out of which an accident arose. 
Unless such statements qualify as spontaneous declarations, 
were. made within the scope of the employment, or are 80_ 
da.maging as to be admissible as declarations against interest, 
there is no basis for an assumption of reliability that would 
justify dispensing with the oath and cross-examination. In the 
present case, for example, the very vagueness of Hood's 
description of the workt which was given to plaintiff's 
investigator very largely in answer to leading questions, 
demonstrates how essential to fair elucidation it may be that 
the evidence be secured only by deposition or at trial. [8] We 
conclude that the terms "obligation or duty" in former sec-
tion 1851 and "liability, obligation, or duty" in Evidence 
Code sections 1224 and 1302 do not include tort liabilities of 
employees that are imputed to their employers under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior. [9] Moreover, since any lia-
bility of Hood would only become a "question in dispute" in 
the owners' action for indemnity against the contractors if it 
was imputable to the contractors under the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior, any such liability of Hood is also not a 
"liability, obligation, or duty" within the meanings of the 
statutes in the owners' indemnity action. 
[10] The error was not prejudicial to the 'owners, for 
Hood's statement tended to place responsibility on the con-
) 
) 
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tractors for creating the dangerous condition of the railing 
and had no bearing on whether the owners should have 
discovered that condition. Moreover, since the owners offered 
the statement in evidence, they in no event could complain of 
the trial court's ruling. The error was prejudicial to the 
contractors, however, both as to the .judgment in favor of 
plaintiff and the judgment in favor of the owners. There is a 
direct conflict in the evidence whether, in removing the bins, 
the contractors in any way changed the condition of the rail-
ing and whether the bins had served to hold the railing in 
place. Although only the owners offered Hood's statement in 
evidence, plaintiff urged its admissibility and relied upon it 
in his argument to the jury to establish the contractors' lia-
bility. We conclude that had Hood's statement been excluded, 
there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have 
exonerated the contractors from responsibility for the acci-
dent, both to plaintiff on his complaint and to the owners on 
their cross-complaint. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. 
Watson,46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) 
The contractors contend that the trial court erred in deny-
ing their motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on 
the cross-complaint on the ground that their contract with the 
owners precludes any duty to indemnify the owners under the 
facts of this case. 
The contract provides that" Contractor agrees to commence 
said removal and demolition work immediately, and to cause 
said removal and demolition work to progress in a diligent 
and workmanlike manner. . . . Contractor shall use due dili-
gence to protect the property of the owner in the performance 
of the agreed work and will carry adequate public liability 
insurance and property damage insurance to protect the 
Owner and will hold Owner harmless and defend Owner in 
any suit at law for damages which might arise in connection 
with the agreed work. " 
[11] Since the parties expressly contracted with respect to 
the contractors' duty to indemnify the owners, the extent of 
that duty must be determined from the contract and not from 
the independent doctrine of equitable indemnity. (See City &-
County 0/ San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Ca1.2d 127, 130-138 
[330 P.2d 802] ; cf. Horn &- Barker, Inc. v. Macco Corp., 228 
Cal.App.2d 96, 101 [39 Cal.Rptr. 320] ; Pierce v. Turner, 205 
Cal.App.2d 264, 267-268 [23 Cal.Rptr. 115]; American Can 
Co. v. City &- County 0/ San Francisco, 202 Cal.App.2d 520, 
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525 [21 Cal.Rptr. 33].) [12] In the absence of conflicting 
extrinsic evidence the interpretation of the contract is a ques-
tion for the court. (Parsons v. Bristol Development Co., 62 
Ca1.2d 861,864 [44 Cal.Rptr. 767, 402 P.2d 839].) 
[13] The contractors contend that their agreement to 
indemnify'the owners was limited to causes of action arising 
while the work was in progress and excluded causes of action 
arising thereafter. There is no merit in this contention, for the 
contract refers to "any suit at law for damages which might 
arise in connection with the agreed work." There is no basis 
for concluding that this clause does not mean what it says or 
that the parties were concerned with "when" rather than 
"how" a cause of action for damages might arise. Had they 
so intended, it would have been a simple matter to provide 
that the cause of action" arise in connection with and during 
the agre,ed work. ' , 
An indemnity clause phrased in general terms will not be 
interpreted, however, to provide indemnity for consequences 
resulting from the indemnitee's own actively negligent acts. 
(Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal.2d 40, 44-45 
[41 Cal.Rptr. 73, 396 P .2d 377] ; Vinnell Co. v. Pacific Elec. 
RY. Co., 52 Ca1.2d 411, 415 [340 P.2d 604].) [14] Mere 
nonfeasance, however, such as a negligent failure to discover a 
dangerous condition arising from the work will not preclude 
indemnity under a general clause such as the one in this case. 
(Harvey Machine Co. v. Hatzel if Buehler, Inc., 54 Ca1.2d 445, 
448-449 [6 Cal.Rptr. 284, 353 P.2d 924] ; Baldwin Contracting 
Co. v. Winston Steel Works, Inc., 236 Cal.App.2d 565, 571-573-
[46 Cal.Rptr. 421]; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Massachusetts 
Bonding if Ins. Co., 202 Cal.App.2d 99, 111-113 [20 Cal.Rptr. 
820].) [15] Since there was substantial evidence that 
plaintiff's cause of action arose in connection with the work 
performed by the contractors and that the negligence of the 
owners was passive rather than active, the trial court did not 
err in denying the contractors' motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict. 
The part of the judgment on the complaint in favor of 
plaintiff and against the owners is affirmed. The part of the 
jUdgment on the complaint in favor of plaintiff and against 
the contractors is reversed. The judgment for the owners on 
the cross-complaint is reversed. The order denying the motion 
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is affirmed. The 
appeals from the order denying the motions for new trial are 
dismissed. Plainti1f shall recover costs against the owners on 
) 
the owners' appeal from the judgment for plaintiff. The 
parties shall bear their own costs on the other appeals. 
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J. 
and Sullivan, J., concurred. 
